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Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal
and Civil Law Models-And What Can Be Done
About It
John C. Coffee, Jr.t
Ken Mann's professed goal is to "shrink" the criminal law.' To realize this
worthy end, he advocates punitive civil sanctions that would largely parallel
criminal sanctions, thereby reducing the need to use criminal law in order to
achieve punitive purposes.2 I agree (heartily) with the end he seeks and even
more with his general precept that "the criminal law should be reserved for the
most damaging wrongs and the most culpable defendants." 3 But I believe that
the means he proposes would be counterproductive-and would probably
expand, rather than contract, the operative scope of the criminal law as an
engine of regulation and social control.
The differences in our analyses follow from differences in our perspectives.
Professor Mann's focus is largely doctrinal and basically centers on the question
of whether courts will accept candidly punitive civil penalties. My perspective
is more behavioral and focuses on incentives: what would regulators and private
enforcers do under a legal system that largely overlaid punitive civil sanctions
on top of criminal penalties? We also begin from different starting points.
Although we both agree that the line between civil and criminal penalties is
rapidly collapsing, Professor Mann sees (and favors) the encroachment of the
civil law upon the criminal law. I see more of the reverse trend: the encroach-
ment of the criminal law into areas previously thought to be civil or "regulato-
ry" in character. Thus, I want to resist encroachment, while he wishes to
encourage it in order to give enforcement authorities the less drastic remedy
of civil penalties.
Apparently, Professor Mann sees no fundamental difference in the purposes
of the civil law and the criminal law: both seek, he argues, to deter through
punishment. Here, I think his usually acute powers of analysis have proven
t Adolf A. Berle Professor, Columbia Law School.
1. Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101
YALE LU. 1795, 1802 (1992). ("Thus, I advocate the shrinking of the criminal law in order to fit it into
its proper role in the law of sanctions, next to an expanding arena of punitive civil sanctions.").
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1861.
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myopic. Although both bodies of law seek to deter, they have historically
enforced substantively different types of norms, which are purposely articulated
with different levels of precision. When the criminal law is used to enforce civil
law norms that are aspirational in character and deliberately soft-edged, the
result may distort the civil law. More theoretical attempts to explain the civ-
il/criminal distinction have suggested that society may have particular "transac-
tion structures" for dealing with different areas of social behavior, sometimes
using rules that trigger only civil liability and sometimes using criminal sanc-
tions.4 Obviously, to the extent that these different "transaction structures"
exist, authorizing the interchangeable use of civil or criminal sanctions may
distort them. For example, applying the civil law to behavior that has tradition-
ally been punished criminally might deprive society of its ability to focus
censure and assign blame with the moral force that the criminal law may
uniquely possess. In short, even if the civil law could provide equivalent
deterrence, it may not be able to perform as successfully the socializing and
educative roles that the criminal law performs in our society.
Professor Mann's casual use of the term "deterrence" is also somewhat
imprecise. The law can deter in different ways and to different degrees. Bor-
rowing terms coined by Professor Robert Cooter, I would suggest that in its
characteristic operation, the civil law "prices," while the criminal law "sanc-
tions."5 The difference between a price and a sanction is at bottom the differ-
ence between, on one hand, a tax that brings private and public costs into
balance by forcing the actor to internalize costs that the actor's conduct imposes
on others and, on the other, a significantly discontinuous increase in the expect-
ed cost of the behavior that is intended to dissuade the actor from engaging in
the activity at all.6 From this starting point, I would argue that the criminal law
should be reserved to prohibiting conduct that society believes lacks any social
utility, while civil penalties should be used to deter (or "price") many forms
of misbehavior (for example, negligence) where the regulated activity has
positive social utility but is imposing externalities on others. This
4. See Jules L. Coleman, Crime, Kickers, and Transaction Structure, in NOMOS XXVII: CRIMINALJUSTICE 313 (1. Ronald Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1935); Alvin K. KIevorick, Legal Theory and
the Economic Analysis of Torts and Crimes, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 905, 907-08 (1985); Alvin K. Klevorick,
On the Economic Theory of Crime, in NOMOS XXVII: CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra, at 289.
5. Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLI-M. L. REv. 1523 (1984). I recognize, of course, that
punitive damages are an exceptidn to this generation. See infra note 26.
6. One can also describe this difference as that between "optimal" and "total" deterrence. See Jason
S. Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficiency in Tort Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1385 (1987);Alan H. Scheiner, Note, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages, The Seventh Amendment and The Politics
of Jury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 142, 173-75 (1991). To illustrate, the optimal amount of fraud is zero,
see Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841, 847 (7th Cir. 1991), but the same cannot be said for pollution,
which is an inevitable byproduct of industrial society. On this basis, fraud is a natural candidate for criminalpenalties, and nonfraudulent (i.e., negligent) pollution for civil penalties. In addition, there are also crimes
where the gain or benefit to the criminal actor is wholly illicit (the obvious example is the crime of rape),
and thus a mere "pricing" policy produces the morally objectionable result that the defendant can benefit.
Hence, a total deterrent approach is necessary. See infra note 28.
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"pricing"I'prohibiting" distinction is probably consistent with the general
public's understanding of the difference between a tax and a criminal penalty.
Indeed, precisely because this distinction is understood and accepted, I am
skeptical of Professor Mann's suggestion that we should discard it by expanding
the civil law to perform the same punitive functions as the criminal law.
We agree, however, on one theme: the criminal law should not be overused.
This position stems not only from the usual fairness considerations, but also
from a sense (at least on my part) that overuse will impair the criminal law's
nondeterrent functions. Recent scholarship has emphasized the criminal law's
socializing role as a system for moral education.7 In similar terms, economists
have viewed the criminal law as an instrument for shaping preferences as well
as for imposing costs.' This "preference-shaping" role posits that the criminal
law can and should affect not simply the rational actor's perception of the costs
of crime, but also the actor's perception of the benefits from crime. To perform
this role, however, the criminal law's scope must be limited because society's
capacity to focus censure and blame is among its scarcest resources. Thus, I
would seek to reduce the scope of the criminal law by focusing it on a limited
range of misbehavior. In contrast, Professor Mann seems to propose only
procedural, not substantive, limitations. Although he would encourage less
frequent resort to the criminal law by offering public enforcers the alternative
of broadly overlapping punitive civil penalties, this strategy does not "shrink"
the scope of the criminal law, but only the frequency of its actual use (and only
if his behavioral premises are correct).
Those who suggest that substantive limits can be placed on the scope of
the criminal law face an obligation that Professor Mann does not: to describe,
at least in principle, the conceptual limits that should be recognized and to
determine whether their attainment is feasible. This Comment approaches that
task in four stages. Part I surveys the recent expansion of the criminal law into
domains previously thought civil in character. Part II assesses whether concep-
tual distinctions between civil and criminal deterrence are still possible once
we acknowledge that tort law has a preventive purpose. Part III considers the
behavioral effects of broadly empowering governmental enforcers to choose
between civil and criminal sanctions (as Professor Mann proposes). Part IV then
tentatively assesses what incremental steps might be taken to reestablish a
civil/criminal border.
7. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990) (employing survey research to find that
public complies with law largely because of its perceived moral legitimacy, not its deterrent threat). For
a fuller discussion of the criminal law as a system of moral education, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Does
"Unlawfl" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law,
71 B.U. L REV. 193 (1991).
8. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping
Policy, 1990 DUKE L. 1. A number of the economic concepts used in this article were first articulated by
either Professor Dau-Schmidt or Professor Johnston. See Johnston, supra note 6.
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I. THE PARADIGMS BLUR: THE ENCROACHMENT OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW ON THE CIVIL LAW
Most commentators acknowledge that the following attributes tend to
distinguish the criminal law from the civil law: (1) the greater role of intent
in the criminal law, with its emphasis on subjective awareness rather than
objective reasonableness; (2) the criminal law's focus on risk creation, rather
than actual harm; (3) its insistence on greater evidentiary certainty and its lesser
tolerance for procedural informality; (4) its reliance on public enforcement,
tempered by prosecutorial discretion; and (5) its deliberate intent to inflict
punishment in a manner that maximizes stigma and censure.9 In contrast, tort
law usually seeks only to force defendants to internalize the social costs that
their conduct imposes on others.'0 Its focus then is on harm, not blame. Pro-
fessor Mann mentions most of these points (and others), and his discussion is
instructive.
But there is one important difference that he largely ignores: criminal laws
are legislative acts, while the civil law is largely judge-made. Early in the legal
history of the United States, the separation of powers doctrine was interpreted
to bar federal judges from creating common law crimes (as they did in Great
Britain)." But even apart from our unique constitutional context, in all com-
mon law countries, advance legislative specification today constitutes a funda-
mental prerequisite to a criminal prosecution.
In contrast, the civil law is always developing through judicial enlargement,
often in surprising ways. American courts create new torts on a daily basis, and
new substantive legal principles are regularly applied retroactively. The concept
of "fair notice" is less of a normative barrier in the civil context, because courts
are usually dealing with the allocation of losses between the parties. Thus, the
question in such a context is not whether to impose a substantial penalty on
the defendant, but rather how to divide losses actually incurred between plaintiff
and defendant. In any event, the important point is that if a legal prohibition
were enacted as both a criminal and a civil rule, there is a greater likelihood
that it would experience judicial expansion-first in its civil law setting, but
eventually (on a catchup basis) in its criminal setting. Moreover, judicial
lawmaking inevitably tends to result in standards with a decidedly soft-edged,
fuzzy quality. This imprecision is consistent with the natural desire of judges
9. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 7; Robert W. Drane & David J. Neal, On Moral Justifications for theTortl/Crime Distinction, 68 CAL. L. REV. 398,402-03 (1980); Richard A. Epstein, Crime and Tort: Old Wine
in New Bottles, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION, RETRMUTION, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 231,
248-54 (Randy E. Barnett & John Hagel III eds., 1977).
10. Learned Hand's great contribution to the law of torts was the formulation of a legal rule that
essentially did this (and no more). See United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)(defendant's obligation is to invest in precautions up to point where marginal costs to actor equal marginal
benefits to society in terms of reduced losses to victims).
11. See United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 415 (1816); United States v. Hudson& Goodwin,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
1878 [Vol. 101: 1875
Paradigms Lost
to leave themselves discretion and flexibility in future cases. Consider, for
example, Cardozo's classic phrase: "A trustee is held to something stricter than
the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor
the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior."12 This "punctilio of
honor" standard is soft-edged and aspirational. Because such a standard can
never be fully realized nor even defined with specificity in advance, it seems
self-evident that it should not be criminalized.
Recently, however, this standard has been criminalized to an astonishing
degree. Mail and wire fraud cases that have equated breaches of fiduciary duty
with an illegal "scheme to defraud" present the best illustration of this phenom-
enon of the criminal law's encroachment on the civil law. During the 1970's,
without any statutory change in the law, courts began to hold-first in cases
involving public officials and then in cases involving all types of private
fiduciaries-that a knowing breach of fiduciary duty could amount to a "scheme
to defraud" for purposes of the mail and wire fraud statutes. 13 These cases
made any undisclosed conflict of interest criminal if the defendant occupied a
fiduciary or similar relationship.1 4 This use of the criminal sanction to enforce
fiduciary duties reflects the simplistic view that any desirable legal standard
should be enforced by the strongest available sanction: namely, the criminal
law. Obviously, advocates of this approach fail to understand how remedial law
can affect and distort substantive law, changing both how it is read and how
it will develop. For example, if the ethical standards of bar associations and
other private groups were regularly criminalized, it would not take long before
these groups began to self-insure by adopting less aspirational standards. Yet,
as I read Professor Mann, his prescription advocates the overlap of civil and
criminal law in the hopes that the availability of more punitive civil penalties
for the same conduct would dissuade prosecutors from resorting to criminal
sanctions. In contrast, my view is that the overlap is itself a problem. Thus, in
my view, a breach of a fiduciary duty, standing alone, should not fall within
the purview of the criminal law at all (although it could certainly be subject
to civil penalties).15
12. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
13. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1988). I have discussed the expansion of these statutes at length
elsewhere. See John C. Coffee, Jr., From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminalization of
Fiduciary Breaches and the Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 117 (1981);
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Metastasis of Mail Fraud: The Continuing Story of the "Evolution" of a White-
Collar Crime, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (1983).
14. The growth, decline, and eventual reemergence of this "intangible rights" doctrine has been
discussed at length elsewhere. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), sharply cut back on the
expansion of these statutes. Congress, however, has largely overridden McNally. See 18 U.S.C. § 1346
(1988). For a recent update on the case law, see Donna M. Maus, Note, License Procurement and the
Federal Mail Fraud Statute, 58 U. CHL L. REv. 1125 (1991).
15. Again, this is an area where criminalizing a civil law standard may distort its development. Once
courts understand that fiduciary duties can be criminally enforced so that a simple undisclosed conflict of
interest can become criminal, they may begin to become more cautious in articulating fiduciary duties, using
not the traditional rhetoric of undivided loyalty, but the narrower formulations of the corporate lawyer.
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Nor is this example of the "intangible rights" doctrine unique. The law
defining insider trading is also wholly judge-made, 16 and has expanded recur-
rently. A similar expansion has occurred in the case of the Hobbs Act and other
major "white-collar" crime statutes.17 To be sure, at times, courts have also
contracted the law. The crucial point, however, is that the important substantive
developments in either direction have recently been judge-made to an extraordi-
nary degree.'8
At the same time that courts have begun to apply the penalties of the
criminal law to legal standards that evolved within the civil law, they have also
shown an increasing tendency to abandon some of the most important limits
on the criminal law. For example, in some areas of white-collar criminal law
there is a noticeable trend toward the acceptance of vicarious responsibility. 9
Additionally, although private enforcement of the criminal law has long been
rejected in the United States, where prosecutorial discretion is venerated, a trend
toward the delegation of this discretion is evident in recent legislation empower-
ing both civil authorities and private individuals to seek quasi-criminal penal-
ties.20 These trends would accelerate if the substantive content of the criminal
law could be enforced in civil and administrative proceedings. In this respect,
I view Professor Mann's proposal as a road map to overcriminalization.
A principal cause of overcriminalization is the profligate extension of the
criminal sanction to cover all rules lawfully promulgated by an administrative
agency. It has become the common statutory pattern in the United States for
a statute establishing an administrative agency to provide that any willful
violation of the rules adopted by the agency constitutes a federal felony.21 As
16. While the federal securities law creates a private right of action with respect to insider trading,Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 20A, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1988), no statutory definition of insider tradinghas been attempted. The crime is sometimes prosecuted under the mail and wire fraud statutes and
sometimes under the securities laws. Compare Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) with United
States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en bane), petition for cert.filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3500 (U.S.
Jan. 1, 1991) (No. 91-1085).
17. See United States v. Kattar, 840 F2d 118 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. Covino, 837 F2d 65(2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Paschall, 772 F2d 68 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Williams, 621 F2d
123 (5th Cir. 1980); Charles F.C. Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case Study in the
Making of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 GEO. L. 1171 (1977). Again, there are signs that the Supreme Court
may be reining in the Hobbs Act, as it did in the case of mail fraud. See McCormick v. United States, 111
S. Ct. 1807 (1991); United States v. Evans, 910 F.2d 790 (11th Cit 1990), cert. granted, Ill S. Ct. 2256
(1991).
18. McCormick, 111 S. Ct. 1807, McNally, 483 U.S. 350, and Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), have
all cut back on broader theories of liability. Meanwhile, Congress has remained largely paralyzed. The single
exception is its passage of a one-sentence statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988), reversing much of McNally.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d 1123, 1130 n.11 (3d Cir. 1979); United
States v. Starr, 535 E2d 512 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Y. Hata & Co., 535 F2d 508 (9th Cir. 1976).
For a discussion of the current state of the law, see Coffee, supra note 7, at 213-15.
20. For a detailed review, see Bruce A. Green, After the Fall: The Criminal Law Enforcement Response
to the S&L Crisis, 59 FORDHAM L REV. 155, 176-78 (1991) (analyzing provisions of Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act).
21. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(1988); Securities Act of 1933,§ 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1988); Investment Company Act of 1940, § 49, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-48 (1988);
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 217, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-17 (1988).
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a direct result, one estimate places the number of federal regulations currently
punishable by criminal penalties at over 300,000.22 Technical offenses-such
as "stock parking," net capital, or margin rule violations (to give only examples
from the federal securities laws)-are thus potentially punishable under the
same statutory provisions that prohibit fraud. Civil penalties make the greatest
sense in this area-as a replacement for criminal charges, not simply as a
discretionary prosecutorial alternative. Optimally, federal statutes creating an
agency or setting forth some comprehensive system of regulation should still
contain criminal penalties-but only for more serious crimes, such as willful
fraud, bribery, or reckless endangerment. In these cases, the statutory definition
of the crime would require proof of actual moral culpability and not simply the
equivalent of spitting on the sidewalk.
A recurring pattern emerges. Public concern about a newly perceived social
problem-the environment, worker safety, spousal abuse-triggers a societal
reflex in the United States: the adoption of new criminal legislation that typical-
ly elevates any knowing or willful violation of the statutory regime to the status
of an indictable felony. No doubt these social problems are serious (and no
attempt to minimize the injuries from them is intended). But as this process of
reflexive criminalization continues, its little-noticed consequence is to expose
a significant portion of the population of the United States to potential entangle-
ment with the criminal law during the ordinary course of their professional and
personal lives. 3 Actual use of the criminal sanction might remain rare, but
it is the threat of its use that must be chiefly considered in evaluating the
degree of freedom within a society. To be sure, some may justify pervasive use
of the criminal sanction based on simple cost/benefit reasoning: the loss to
those imprisoned is less than the harm thereby averted through specific and
general deterrence. Yet this analysis depends on a myopic social cost account-
ing. Even if the deterrent effect gained under such a system of enforcement
exceeded the penalties actually imposed, additional costs need to be considered,
including the fear and anxiety imposed on risk-averse individuals forced to live
under the constant threat of draconian penalties. These citizens would bear not
only the risks of false accusation and erroneous conviction, but also the constant
fear that they might commit an unintentional violation.' Ultimately, if we
22. This estimate was made by Stanley Arkin, a well-known defense practitioner in this field. See
Coffee, supra note 7, at 216 n.94.
23. This was precisely the concern of Professor Packer, writing over 20 years ago. See HERBERT L.
PACKER, THE LDMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968). In his view, the principle of fair notice was
chiefly intended to permit ordinary citizens to be able to arrange their affairs so as to avoid entanglement
with the criminal law (or presumably with other forms of extreme penalties).
24. Because it is a generally recognized principle that "ignorance of the law is no excuse," unintentional
violations are more likely to result from the use of the criminal law as a backstop to enforce technical rules
and regulations. Those who believe these costs are minor should consider the following heuristic example:
Suppose a utilitarian society adopts a penalty of capital punishment for speeding, on the plausible assumption
that it would greatly reduce the 50,000 traffic fatalities incurred annually in return for only a few executions.
The principal cost ignored by such a social calculus is the fear engendered among drivers that they might
negligently break this law. In addition, overdeterrence and consequent efficiency losses would result as the
18811992]
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measure the success of the criminal law exclusively in terms of the number of
crimes prevented, we could wind up, in Herbert Packer's memorable phrase,
"creating an environment in which all are safe but none is free."5 Yet, if the
threat of the criminal law's use should be curtailed, Professor Mann's proposals
do little or nothing to reduce that threat.
II. THE PARADIGMS DISTINGuISHED: PRICING VERSUS PROHIBITING
Professor Mann's key assumption is that once one acknowledges that the
civil law also deters by awarding more-than-compensatory relief, the penalties
the civil law administers become indistinguishable from those that the criminal
law administers. As a prediction, this may unfortunately prove to be correct,
but his claim need not be accepted as a matter of logic. To be sure, Professor
Mann is entirely accurate in describing the current state of the constitutional
law on the civil/criminal distinction as chaotic. The Supreme Court has begun
to talk about punishment and deterrence as if no distinction existed.Y At times,
it has seemingly equated punitive damages, civil penalties, and criminal
fines.27 But these scattered statements do not express any coherent judicial
theory, and thus they only raise, rather than resolve, the central policy question
on which I wish to focus: can a civil/criminal distinction be resurrected? Or
should we accept the two bodies of law as simply interchangeable means to
the same ends?
To draw a possible line of distinction, it is useful to return to the difference
between prices and sanctions. Assume that a correctly calculated "price" forces
the actor to internalize the social costs of an activity. Thus, if the actor's
business imposes external costs on others (whether in the form of industrial
accidents, pollution, or injuries from unanticipated side effects or defects in the
product), tort law often requires the actor to pay these external costs to the
risk-averse turned to public transportation or engaged in inefficiently low-speed driving. Still, the greatest
cost would be the anxiety that such a legal rule would visit on those unavoidably subject to it.
25. See PACKER, supra note 23, at 65.
26. In Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, I llS. Ct. 1032 (1991), the Court upheld a punitive damages
award. But the Court suggested that such an award could violate due process if not checked by a judicial
review intended to ensure that "the award does 'not exceed an amount that will accomplish society's goals
of punishment and deterrence."' Id. at 1045 (quoting Green Oil Co. v. Homsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 222 (Ala.
1989) and Wilson v. Dukona Corp., 547 So. 2d 70,73 (Ala. 1999)). Thus, Haslip at least hints that a merely
"grossly excessive" standard, which does not provide more limiting standards for reviewing punitive
damages, is constitutionally suspect. See also Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp., 947 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1991)(finding punitive damage award violated due process); Union Nat'l Bank v. Mosbacher, 933 F.2d 1440 (8th
Cir. 1991) (remanding for determination whether punitive damages violated due process).
27. In particular, the Court has recently emphasized that punitive damages are intended "to punish
defendants for torts committed with fraud, actual malice, violence, or oppression." Molzof v. United States,
112 S. Ct. 711, 715 (1992); see also Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422 n.7 (1987) ("The more
important characteristic of the remedy of civil penalties is that it exacts punishment .... Thus, the remedy
of civil penalties is similar to the remedy of punitive damages .... ); Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 350 (1974) (punitive damages "are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct
and deter its future occurrence.").
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victims, thereby giving the actor a greater incentive to take precautions. In
theory, the rational actor will take precautions up to the point where the
marginal cost of further precautions equals the marginal benefit from reducing
the actor's expected liability. Legal rules that exact a "price" thus straddle the
deterrent/compensatory watershed because they seek to do both; that is, they
seek to make victims whole and to induce precautions that avert future injuries.
Clearly, their purpose is not prohibitory in the sense of forbidding entirely the
activity in question by imposing penalties greater than the social costs created
by the activity. Indeed, if the defendant's benefit from the conduct exceeds the
victim's loss (adjusted to reflect the limited likelihood of apprehension), the
defendant is free under optimal deterrence theory to engage in conduct that
harms others at will, so long as the defendant pays all compensation.2
A social cost ceiling thus bounds an "optimal deterrence" or "pricing"
approach. However, imposing penalties that exceed the compensatory relief
victims would receive does not mean that this social cost ceiling is being
exceeded or that "punishment" (in the constitutional sense) is necessarily being
inflicted. For example, victims often will not know of their injury or they will
not come forward to seek compensation (for any of a variety of reasons,
including the prohibitive costs of litigation). In these cases, the same incentive
to take optimal precautions will nevertheless still result, if either (1) the state
exacts an equivalent civil penalty, or (2) a private claimant receives a more-
than-compensatory award in the same aggregate amount as the compensatory
damages would have been had all the injured sued and recovered. In short, the
economic effect of such a penalty is still to induce the same higher level of care
and precaution that essentially balances the actor's private costs with the social
costs of the activity. Obviously, because the penalty is not redistributed to the
victims, it does not provide compensation. Thus, although the penalty appears
to fall on the deterrence side of Professor Mann's watershed, it is arguably not
punitive in the same way that criminal penalties that seek to deny the defendant
any benefit whatsoever from the conduct are punitive. In short, such an example
illustrates a penalty level that is deterrent, but not punitive.
If a civil penalty equal to the social cost of the behavior can be described
as nonpunitive, then arguably the full constitutional safeguards applicable to
criminal prosecutions need not apply. Of course, it must be conceded that
damage estimation is an inexact science, and such a limit on civil penalties
could be quite high. Sometimes the social costs from crime may include third-
party effects that may be substantially larger (or smaller) than the compensatory
28. See WILLIAM R. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 153-
60 (1987). Most theorists recognize that some forms of pleasure or utility may be illicit and should be
subject to total deterrence. Cf. id. at 156-57 & n.9; STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT
LAW 147-48 (1987). Some of these theorists argue, however, that total deterrence should never apply to
profit-making activities in markets. That is not my claim. Rather, I argue that the criminal law should be
oriented towards "total deterrence" and the civil law toward "optimal deterrence." What should fall within
each of these two categories is, of course, debatable.
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relief the civil law would award to injured victims. Consider, for example, the
negligent sales of securities. The social loss here is not just the monetary loss
to investors (which is a wealth transfer and hence only a private loss), but the
higher cost of capital that other issuers may have to bear because investors are
now marginally more skeptical of the accuracy of disclosures made by all
issuers.29 These other issuers suffer an externality caused by the wrongdoer's
conduct, but they have no private remedy. Thus, civil penalties that seek to
internalize social costs are not necessarily related to the compensatory damages
that the civil law would assess.
Where then is the watershed between civil and criminal penalties? Else-
where, I have suggested that it lies in the distinction between "pricing" and
"prohibiting."3 The legal system sometimes attempts not simply to force
actors to internalize the social costs of their activities, but to deny any gain to
the defendant from the activity. In such cases, the optimal level of the activity
is judged to be zero because the activity is deemed to lack social utility in any
form (even though it may produce utility for the actor). For example, the civil
law only taxes most industrial polluters because it wants them to reduce their
level of pollution-not to cease production altogether. In contrast, the criminal
law typically wants to bar some activities entirely, for example, theft, rape,
murder-and some forms of environmental pollution. This approach (which
some call "total deterrence") sees the victim as having a moral right to be free
of the defendant's conduct, regardless of its profitability or its greater utility
to the defendant or society.31
To generalize, let us say then that characteristically the criminal law
prohibits, while the civil law prices. This statement is not only a positive
description of the law, but also a normative assertion. The pursuit of "total
deterrence" should be carefully limited, with the state clearly identifying in
advance the proscribed conduct and with potential defendants receiving fair
warning. Identifying the forms of conduct wholly lacking in social utility and
thus subject to "total deterrence" seems quintessentially a legislative act. Put
differently, courts are entitled to some discretion in pursuing optimal deterrence
but not in deciding when to pursue total deterrence. In this light, the real
problem with punitive damages is both that they represent a retrospective
pursuit of total deterrence and that they lack the legitimacy that only the
legislature can confer. The decision that the benefits derived by the defendant
are so perverse, immoral, or otherwise unacceptable as to be wholly disregarded
by society (and thus "prohibited" by a total deterrence policy) should require
a greater communal consensus than a judicial or a jury decision represents.
Viewed this way, greater vagueness in the civil law is justified precisely
29. See, e.g., Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841, 84647 (7th Cir. 1991).
30. Coffee, supra note 7, at 225-28.
31. See Johnston, supra note 6; Scheiner, supra note 6, at 175.
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because the civil law is only "pricing" behavior (that is, estimating costs),
which requires no new social consensus.
Still, a problem with this dichotomy is that through punitive damages the
civil law can pursue a total deterrence strategy. But this recognition only
explains why I am wary of Professor Mann's willingness to legitimate punish-
ment as a goal of the civil law. Above all, I doubt that administratively imposed
penalties will ever reflect the same scrupulous concern for the defendant's
rights as displayed in a criminal trial. Even in the light of the doctrinal conver-
gence that he demonstrates, I would still cling to this normative hope: when
the legislature uses an abrupt, discontinuous increase in penalty levels to
prohibit, rather than to price, behavior, such a use of deterrence should trigger
at least some of the constitutional safeguards applicable to a criminal trial.
Still, this statement faces an obvious operational problem: if the social costs
of legitimate behavior can be high, how does one distinguish attempts to price
from attempts to prohibit? A recent Supreme Court decision hints that the Court
wants a bright-line distinction before it attempts to distinguish between optimal
and total deterrence.32 On occasion, a statute's legislative history may answer
this question, but the most practical guide is whether the penalty has been
intentionally enhanced in order to deny any possibility of benefit to the defen-
dant. If all else fails, the ultimate inquiry might be whether the statute reflects
a judgment that the activity in question so lacked positive social utility that its
optimal level was zero. In such cases, one can presume the legislature intended
to prohibit rather than price such behavior. Often, this is clear. Theft, for
example, clearly lacks social utility because it forces society to expend resourc-
es on costs, such as locks, security devices, and enforcement systems, that
would otherwise be unnecessary. Similarly, Judge Easterbrook recently opined
that "[t]he optimal amount of fraud is zero., 33 Clearly, however, the optimal
level of pollution or worker accidents is above zero, because to reduce these
levels to zero would require unlimited expenditures on precautions. In these
cases, where the fair inference should be that the legislature only intended to
"price" the negligent behavior, the assessment of civil penalties would not have
to comply with the higher procedural standards applicable to criminal or quasi-
criminal fines.
To sum up this part, the line between the civil and criminal law might be
drawn in terms of whether financial penalties seek simply to force actors to
internalize the full social costs of their behavior or whether they seek to deprive
the actor of any gain whatsoever from the illicit activity. Traditionally, the
criminal law has pursued the latter end, as the pervasive use of capital punish-
ment for most felonies and the tradition that the felon's property escheated to
32. See Molzof v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 711, 717 (1992) (noting that "Govenument's interpretation
of punitive damages would be difficult and impractical to apply" where it sought to deem as punitive
damages any form of compensation for nonpecuniary injuries).
33. See Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d at 847.
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the crown seems to demonstrate. Although this proposed line between "pricing"
and "prohibiting" would still permit civil penalties of a magnitude likely to
deter, it frames a different standard than the compensatory/deterrent dichotomy
that Professor Mann argues courts have used in the past to rationalize civil
penalties of intermediate severity. Under this proposed social cost ceiling on
civil penalties, the monetary penalty levied by the state would not need to
compensate actual victims, but would primarily induce the taking of precau-
tions. Also, the receipt of more-than-compensatory damages by a private
plaintiff would prove nothing of significance, because the plaintiff-private or
public-should be seen as the delegated agent of the state (or, in more tradition-
al terminology, as a private attorney general). Only when the penalty exceeded
the maximum social cost ascribable to the activity would the civil/criminal
boundary necessarily be crossed.
From a policy perspective, this distinction between "pricing" through civil
penalties and "prohibiting" through criminal penalties leads to an obvious policy
question: why should society ever prefer prices over the more effective weapon
of sanctions? One reason is obvious. When society wants not to proscribe the
activity, but only to reduce its level, it should use prices. Another answer, given
by Professor Cooter, is subtler: the choice depends on whether it is less costly
to determine the correct standard of behavior or to determine the social costs
caused by a departure from that standard.3 Ie argues that because behavior
is relatively responsive to changes in price levels, the use of prices is preferable
when society wishes to reduce the level of an activity, but does not feel able
to define the precise standard of behavior it wants. In contrast, the use of
sanctions makes sense when society can precisely articulate the desired standard
of conduct, because then prices have the disadvantage of permitting low-cost
departures from that standard so long as the degree of departure is modest.
Interestingly, this prescription correlates closely with the earlier noted tendency
for civil law rules to be soft-edged and fuzzy in comparison to criminal law
rules. Inherently, the civil law contemplates modest, low-cost departures from
its norms, because it only "prices" such departures and does not "prohibit"
them. The criminal law, in contrast, does not even permit small departures,
absent the availability of some special affirmative defense. Again, this analysis
suggests the dangers of allowing the criminal law to encroach on the civil law
insofar as soft-edged legal rules may have been intended to be enforced based
primarily on the extent of the departure from them, not simply on the fact of
a departure.
While Professor Cooter presents the choice between prices and sanctions
as essentially resting on relative information costs,35 the underlying difference
may instead be society's relative moral certainty. If society is certain on moral
34. See Cooter, supra note 5, at 1533.
35. Id.
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grounds of the precise standard it wants to enforce and wishes to tolerate few
departures, then sanctions work better. If, on the other hand, uncertainty or
value tradeoffs exist that cannot be resolved in advance, then prices may be
preferable. The overall structure this relationship points toward is a penumbra
of civil penalties around an inner core of fundamental moral precepts enforced
by sanctions. This structure, however, differs considerably from Professor
Mann's proposal, in which enforcers have near-complete discretion to choose
between criminal and civil penalties.
III. A POLICY APPRAISAL: THE PROBLEMS WITH OVERLAPPING
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL PENALTIES
To this point, I have argued only that a conceptual line could be drawn
between civil and criminal penalties based on whether a particular penalty
sought only to internalize the external costs the actor imposed on others or
whether it sought to prohibit the conduct itself. The larger policy question is
whether such a line should be drawn. If it were drawn, courts might find some
penalties, although officially denominated as civil, sufficiently criminal or
quasi-criminal in nature to invoke some or all of the constitutional protections
afforded the criminal defendant.
Why is it important to distinguish civil from criminal penalties when we
could instead, as Professor Mann suggests, adopt a "middleground jurispru-
dence" applicable to all more-than-compensatory penalties? A partial answer
lies in the incentive effects of overlapping civil and criminal penalties. The first
and most obvious incentive for regulators confronting parallel civil and criminal
penalties is to use the civil option for cases in which either the evidence or the
legal merits are weak.36 Procedural informality benefits the prosecution. The
prosecution obtains a decided advantage when it can try its case in an extrajudi-
cial proceeding before an administrative law judge operating under informal
rules of procedure and evidence.37 Indeed, the one common denominator in
the SEC experience with administrative law judges is familiar: the SEC always
seems to win before its in-house judges.38 Beyond the home court advantage,
36. Others have made the same point. See Green, supra note 20, at 179.
37. The recent settlement accepted by Kaye, Scholer under which it will pay $41 million in damages
to the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) illustrates the procedural leverage the government gains in an
administrative proceeding on its home court. See Stephen Labaton, Law Firm will Pay a $41 Million Fine
in Savings Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 9, 1991, at Al. Other law firms sued by the OTS in judicial actions
have neither settled nor had their assets frozen. While the use of an asset freeze may have precipitated Kaye,
Scholer's sudden capitulation (after months of extended and adversarial negotiations), the relevant point
here is that it is unlikely that the government could have obtained such an extreme pretrial order from an
Article III judge. For the extreme case in which an ex parte order to pay $21 million in restitution by the
next day was upheld in the context of an administrative proceeding, see Spiegel v. Ryan, 946 F.2d 1435
(9th Cir. 1991).
38. An American Bar Association task force studied 62 SEC administrative cases over a five-year
period and found that administrative law judges upheld the SEC in 58 of the cases. See ABA Task Force
Survey Finds ALJs Almost Always Uphold SEC Charges, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 1531
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public enforcers also gain the ability to prove their cases simply by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, rather than beyond a reasonable doubt, and to evade
the jury's ability to nullify an overly harsh law. As a result, civil penalties,
particularly when administratively imposed, could provide the means for
evading constitutional safeguards.
A less obvious reason why overlapping criminal and civil penalties may
not "shrink" the criminal law involves two less visible facts of governmental
life: the inevitability of bureaucratic competition and the struggle for credit An
implicit assumption underlying proposals to expand civil penalties is that federal
criminal cases involving regulatory violations result primarily from criminal
referrals made by administrative agencies to federal prosecutors. On this
premise, if administrative enforcers were armed with powerful civil penalties,
Professor Mann reasons that they might refer less of their enforcement cases
to federal prosecutors, retaining for in-house discipline all but the most egre-
gious violations. Although this reasoning may have some validity, it is naive
in at least two important respects. First, many cases involving regulatory
violations originate within the U.S. Attorney's office. They arise not from an
external agency referral, but spontaneously, through the predictable dynamics
of plea bargaining. Because the principal currencies in plea bargaining are
information and cooperation, a defendant desiring favorable treatment needs
as a practical matter to implicate someone else, preferably someone more
important. The resulting parade of falling dominoes can move in unanticipated
directions, leapfrogging over jurisdictional and subject matter boundaries. Thus,
a bribery investigation might suddenly branch out into a regulatory crime, or
a fraud case could become a criminal tax case as well. Authorizing enhanced
civil penalties will not "shrink" these cases, because federal prosecutors want
credit for the cases they have uncovered.
Predictions that the criminal law will "shrink" in the wake of enhanced civil
penalties also seem unrealistic in light of the bureaucratic incentives to bring
criminal cases. Even if enhanced civil penalties could be assessed more quickly
at lower cost and with a lower reversal rate on appeal, the agency loses the
publicity and public drama that uniquely attends the criminal process. Public
attention is important to an agency for a variety of reasons. Public visibility
may help the agency communicate its self-image as a tough, "no-nonsense"
enforcer. That image may in turn assist the agency in obtaining its desired
budgetary allocation, in recruiting new personnel, or simply in maintaining
morale among its officials. In addition, such an image may generate greater
general deterrence than a substantial number of low-visibility civil penalties,
even if the aggregate amount of the civil penalties imposed were higher.
(Oct. 13, 1989). These judges seem to share the enforcement nission of their agencies. I am aware that the
pattern is different in the case of some other agencies (such as the Social Security Administration), but these
are not public enforcement agencies.
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Still, a deeper reason explains why agencies are likely to persist in seeking
criminal sanctions even if parallel civil penalties were available. No agency
believes that violations of its rules are simply regulatory offenses that lack
inherent moral culpability. Whatever the agency-EPA, SEC, OSHA, FDA-it
is a safe bet that its staffers believe that their agency's rules protect vital public
interests. To communicate this view, the agency needs the public morality
drama that only the criminal law affords. Indeed, the limited empirical evidence
on public attitudes toward white-collar crimes suggests that the public learns
what is criminal from what is punished, not vice versa.39 That is, the use of
the criminal sanction changes public perceptions of the severity of an offense,
increasing the public's estimate of its inherent culpability. Such evidence
underscores the socializing power of the criminal law, but also explains in turn
why there are pressures for its overuse. From the agency's perspective, any
legislative failure to authorize criminal penalties for violations of its rules and
regulations depreciates its mission-particularly in contrast to other agencies
enjoying access to criminal penalties.
A predictable reply to these assertions is that prosecutors have no incentive
to bring petty or technical cases, in part because they may incur judicial
displeasure. This is a partial truth, but one offset by a corresponding perverse
incentive. White-collar investigations take time, typically extending a year or
more from when a U.S. Attorney's office commences a formal investigation
to indictment. Such lengthy investigations require a substantial commitment of
resources. The personal commitment of Assistant U.S. Attorneys actually
conducting the investigation may be even more costly since most of them
anticipate spending only a limited period of time in the office. Suppose, for
example, that a two-year investigation into a suspected "traditional" crime (such
as bribery or fraud) fails to turn up sufficient evidence for an indictment. But
assume further that, as is almost invariably the case, some breach of an agen-
cy's rules and regulations surfaces. At the outset of the investigation, such
evidence of a low-gravity violation would not have interested the prosecutors;
but now, having sunk years of time into what is otherwise a dry well, the
temptation arises for them to justify their efforts by indicting on the technical
violations. Good prosecutors resist this urge to produce an indictment at all
costs, but not all prosecutors live up to this standard. In short, technical viola-
tions may be criminally prosecuted because they provide a face-saving way of
rationalizing failure. In addition, they allow the prosecutor who needs coopera-
tion from a critical witness to pressure the witness to provide the necessary
39. For an excellent analysis of the interactive role between the use of criminal punishment and the
public's perception of what is criminal, see Harry V. Ball & Lawrence M. Friedman, The Use of Criminal
Sanctions in the Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A Sociological View, 17 STAN. L. REV. 197, 213
(1965).
40. For an experienced former federal prosecutor's assessment that this regularly occurs, see Daniel
. Hurson, Limiting the Federal Mail Fraud Statute-A Legislative Approach, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 423,
433 (1983).
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evidence. Whatever the reason, the bottom line is that bureaucratic and careerist
incentives exist for prosecutors to use technical violations as a basis for crimi-
nal prosecutions. No doubt their chosen tool serves them well, but the cost to
society involves tolerating a heightened potential for selective prosecutions.
Finally, a structure of overlapping civil and criminal penalties as proposed
by Professor Mann might have unintended effects on judicial behavior. It is far
easier to expand precedents and make new law in civil cases than in criminal
ones. If enforcers could choose at their discretion between civil and criminal
penalties, they might use the civil route as a vehicle by which to advance novel
theories, hoping to impose criminal penalties later, after establishing the new
theory of liability. In addition, to the extent that there is a "first mover" advan-
tage and decisions by administrative law judges can influence courts, this
technique might be a very effective means for enlarging the scope of the
criminal law. Take, for example, the persistent problem of defining "insider
trading." Had the SEC been able at the outset to develop a body of expansive
administrative precedents defining this term, it is likely that courts would have
deferred to the Commission, given their lesser familiarity with the field.41 If
so, overlapping civil and criminal penalties should expand, not contract, the
criminal law.
IV. THE PARADIGMS REGAINED
Both Professor Mann and I agree that the criminal law should be confined
"to areas of clearly egregious behavior in which severely punitive civil mone-
tary sanctions are ineffective."42 But how does one get there, when today an
extraordinary percentage of federal regulations carry the potential threat of a
criminal sanction? Professor Mann proposes enhanced civil penalties coupled
with the enhanced procedural safeguards of his "middleground jurisprudence."
However, this is an uncertain tradeoff. On one level, public enforcers might fear
that what they lost in terms of foregone flexibility and procedural informality
from such a tradeoff more than offset their gain in increased deterrent threat.
Thus, administrative enforcers might be disinclined to use civil penalties if the
process became, in their judgment, more cumbersome or costly.
Conversely, it is far from clear that halfway measures in terms of enhanced
procedural safeguards truly benefit the defendant. For example, if a "middle-
ground jurisprudence" were to require that administrative law judges employ
an intermediate standard between the civil standard of "preponderance of the
evidence" and the criminal standard of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt," such
41. In fact, the first case to define and proscribe insider trading was an administrative decision, and
courts have uniformly deferred to it since (properly, in my judgment). See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C. 907 (1961). At the time, the SEC had only limited powers to impose administrative civil penalties,
and therefore the subsequent development of insider trading law was largely judicial.
42. See Mann, supra note I, at 1802.
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an intermediate standard-for example, "clear and convincing evidence"--might
represent little more than a symbolic gesture by the state in return for the
defendants' sacrifice of their right to a jury trial. After all, such a standard has
applied to civil commitment hearings without anyone believing that the respon-
dent retains the same safeguards as in a criminal trial. The real inhibitions on
use of the criminal sanction may be factors extrinsic to the formal due process
model: (1) the high costs of a criminal trial, (2) the overloaded dockets of the
criminal courts, (3) the relative independence of an Article III judge, and (4)
the sheer unpredictability of juries and the possibility of jury nullification when
the legal standard seemed overly severe. In contrast, administratively imposed
sanctions tend to be cheap and predictable. Consequently, it seems an indeter-
minate question whether defendants would fare better under a legal regime
permitting the civil imposition of very punitive penalties with only somewhat
enhanced procedural safeguards.
What then is the alternative? Ideally, the Constitution could be read to
require that "true" punishment (that is, penalties above the social cost ceiling
described earlier) could be imposed only by Article III judges in proceedings
where the defendant had the right to a jury trial. This would still permit admin-
istrative proceedings to levy lesser penalties, but would necessitate judicial
imposition of the most draconian penalties. In contrast to Professor Mann's
proposals, this approach would accentuate the difference between judicial and
administrative penalties, not bridge it with his "middleground" jurisprudence.
Unfortunately, little reason exists to think that the current Supreme Court will
move in this sensible direction.43
Therefore, one must focus instead not on constitutional limits, but on
enforcement incentives. Accordingly, to induce regulators to use civil penalties,
it is necessary either to make civil penalties more attractive or criminal penal-
ties less attractive to them. Thus, it may be necessary to accept informal
procedures and not to raise due process standards significantly---except when
the penalties become so severe as to amount to the functional equivalent of
criminal penalties. From a cost-benefit perspective, the basic strategy should
be to preserve (or create) a cost differential favoring civil penalties so that
public enforcers will opt for their use. Such a cost differential is necessary
43. Recent decisions suggest that the Court is no longer fully committed to the position it took in Atlas
Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977), that the legislature
may provide for administratively imposed penalties that do not trigger the applicability of the Seventh
Amendment. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989). Still Granfinanciera recognizes
that "[i]f a claim that is legal in nature asserts a 'public right' ... , then the Seventh Amendment does not
entitle the parties to ajury trial if Congress assigns its adjudication to an administrative agency or specialized
court of equity." 492 U.S. at 42 n.4. This ambiguous category of "public rights" creates an exception broad
enough to encompass all civil penalties and thus to swallow the rule. As a result, if constitutional limitations
are to be imposed on the gravity of the penalty that an administrative tribunal can impose, they are more
likely to emerge from a constitutional reinterpretation of Article Mi. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22
(1932). At present, the trend remains strong in the opposite direction. See Akin v. Office of Thrift Supervi-
sion, 950 F.2d 1180 (5th Cir. 1992) (no right to jury trial in case where administrative agency orders $19
million in restitution).
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because the higher penalties and greater public attention accorded to the
criminal sanction create an inevitable benefit differential favoring their use.
Given the greater deterrent payoff from criminal penalties, civil penalties can
only compete by being cheaper and/or quicker. Yet it is exactly this cost
differential that Professor Mann's proposals seem likely to erode.
An alternative means to the same end might seek to maintain the cost
differential that favors civil penalties by reducing the deterrent benefit from
prosecuting "regulatory" crime through the criminal process. The most direct
means to this end would be to promulgate sentencing guidelines that established
relatively low ceilings on the maximum penalties for such crimes (while
maintaining high penalties for traditional, full "mens rea" crimes, such as fraud
or perjury). Thus, it would become possible for public enforcers to obtain civil
penalties that were higher than the corresponding criminal fines for "regulatory"
crimes. No doubt, some incentives for criminal prosecutions would still remain.
However, both the costs and the benefits of civil penalties could be made more
attractive than criminal prosecutions to public enforcers for precisely those
crimes that we wish to "shrink" out of the criminal law.
But who will bell the cat? Clearly, the legislature has little interest in
"shrinking" the criminal law since it is the body most responsible for thought-
lessly expanding it. While some federal courts have recently shown an apparent
distaste for "regulatory" prosecutions,4 there is no viable constitutional theory
by which they can "shrink" the criminal law. Thus, the one agency that can
affect this cost differential is the U.S. Sentencing Commission, but whether it
has any incentive to do so remains an open question.
Another means of encouraging the use of civil penalties would be to require
prosecutors to conform more strictly to the traditional requirements of the
criminal law paradigm. This approach would imply that mens rea requirements
be enforced more rigorously in criminal cases than in civil penalty assessments,
and that a principle of lenity bar novel expansions of traditional statutory terms.
A series of recent Supreme Court decisions have divided over precisely these
issues, with the faction favoring a strict construction losing about as often as
it wins.45 Even when the strict constructionists win, however, Congress some-
times reverses the result by statute. Thus, the steady encroachment of the
44. For recent and uncharacteristic defeats suffered by the government in white-collar prosecutions (all
in the Second Circuit), see United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), petitionfor
cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3500 (U.S. Jan. 1, 1992) (No. 91-1085); United States v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364
(2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Regan, 937 F2d 823 (2d Cir. 1991), modified, 946 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1991),
petition for cert.filed sub nom. Zarzecki v. United States, 60 U.S.LW. 3553 (U.S. Jan. 30, 1992) (No. 91-
1233); United States v. GAF Corp., 928 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1991).
45. The strict constructionists have recently won in McCormick v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1807
(1991), and in McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1937), but they lost in Moskal v. United States,
111 S. Ct. 461 (1990). Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Moskal is an eloquent reaffirmation of what
he terms the "Rule of Lenity--that venerable principle that 'tefore a man can be punished as a criminal...
his case must be plainly and unmistakably within the provisions of some statute."' 11 S. Ct. at 477 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 485 (1917)).
46. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988). See also Maus, supra note 14.
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criminal law upon fiduciary duties and ethical standards may be the most
important and irreversible development in the substantive criminal law of this
era. Can it be halted? Over the short run, I am pessimistic. De Tocqueville's
observation that in America all important social and political questions ultimate-
ly become questions of law47 needs to be extended one step further: in Ameri-
ca, important social and political issues sooner or later unfortunately generate
issues of criminal law.
47. See ALEXIs DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270 (Jacob P. Mayer ed., 1969) ("There
is hardly a political question in the United States which does not sooner or later turn into a judicial one.").
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